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Abstract: Social media have transformed traditional configurations of how risk 
signals related to an infectious disease outbreak (IDO) are transmitted from 
public health authorities to the general public. However, our understanding of 
how social media might influence risk perceptions during these situations, and 
the influence of such processes on ensuing societal responses remains limited. 
This paper draws on key ideas from the Social Amplification of Risk Framework 
(SARF), Socially Mediated Crisis Communication (SMCC) model and a case study 
of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) social media man-
agement of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic to propose a new conceptual model. The 
Risk Amplification through Media Spread (RAMS) model brings clarity to the 
new complexities in media management of IDOs by delineating the processes of 
message diffusion and risk amplification through communication channels that 
are often highly integrated due to social media. The model offers recommenda-
tions for communication priorities during different stages of an IDO. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the RAMS model from theoretical and applied per-
spectives, and sets the direction for future conceptual refinement and empirical 
testing.
Keywords: emergency; health; outbreak; risk; social media; viral.
1  Background
Infectious disease outbreaks (IDOs), whether ongoing (e.g. HIV/AIDS) or  sporadic 
(e.g. sever acute respiratory [SARS]), can imperil the physical health of millions of 
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people, adversely  influence the social fabric of affected communities, and burden 
economies (Morens and Fauci 2013). During 2003–2012, the Emergency Operations 
Center at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was activated 22 times 
(more than once a year) on account of IDOs (CDC 2013). In the first 7 months of 2014 
alone, the World Health Organization (WHO 2014) tracked three major IDOs: the 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV), the avian influenza 
A (H7N9) virus, and most recently the Ebola virus. Efficient and effective commu-
nications are critical to the performance of IDO preparedness, response and recov-
ery programs given the sudden occurrence, unpredictable nature of spread and 
reach, and uncertainty surrounding prevention and treatment of IDOs.
Between the occurrence of an IDO and its ultimate impact on society, the 
intervening phase is characterized by a series of sociological processes that 
define, diffuse, and shape perceptions of the risk posed by the outbreak. These 
processes involve a range of public health stakeholders and a range of commu-
nication channels through which messages about the outbreak are diffused or 
disseminated.
Traditionally, communications about various aspects of an outbreak (e.g. 
disease burden, symptoms and illness, potential preventive strategies, etc.) were 
“produced” by public health authorities and disseminated through a top-down 
approach to the general public via television, radio or newspapers. This enabled 
the government and public health entities to exercise most of the control over the 
available health and risk-related information (e.g. how the outbreak was playing 
out, who was being impacted, expression of risk levels). Monitoring and surveil-
lance activities related to the IDO were the exclusive domains of health agencies, 
with their public communications similarly lacking a public feedback mecha-
nism (i.e. a method for individuals, such as patients or caretakers to disseminate 
outbreak-related information).
The past five years have witnessed a seismic shift in this information scenario, 
one catalyzed by the global proliferation of social media. Social media refers to 
web and mobile-based technologies and platforms that enable the content crea-
tion, collaboration and exchange by participants and members of the public 
(Cohen 2011). News, opinions, and stories about IDOs can now spread with the 
touch of a screen, from an individual through online social networks, to millions 
of others globally. For example, Twitter, the micro-blogging site recorded nearly 
2 million tweets on the 2009 H1N1 pandemic from May 1 to December 31, 2009 
(Chew and Eysenbach 2010) underlining the volume of IDO information trans-
mitting on social media. More importantly, traditional and mainstream news and 
information organizations have evolved to the point where they, too, use social 
media to create multimedia stories and presentations, graphics, interactive web-
sites and applications, and to obtain information for stories.
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Because social media offer easy-to-use and low cost tools that can help 
public health professionals engage with target populations during health emer-
gencies (Merchant et al. 2011), many public health departments have a dedicated 
and active social media presence, which they use to communicate with the public 
and among themselves (Thackeray et al. 2012; CDC 2014a,b; Department of Health 
[Australian Government] 2014).
Concurrently, cutting-edge innovations that enable the general public to use 
social media for reporting disease-related incidents have emerged. Signaling the 
advent of mobile-based participatory epidemiology (Freifeld et al. 2010;  Vijaykumar 
et  al. 2013) these innovations use nimble crowd-sourcing technologies to gather 
IDO-related information from the public in real-time. Examples include Outbreaks 
Near Me (2010) which enabled users to report knowledge and experiences during 
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic; and Lwin et al.’s (2014) mobile application that enabled 
users to report geo-tagged pictures of dengue breeding sites to health authorities 
in real-time in return for hotspot updates and tailored education.
The role of social media in health emergency communication, particularly 
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the first pandemic in the social media era (Chew and 
Eysenbach 2010), has been extensively studied (Liu and Kim 2011; Signorini 
et al. 2011; Freberg et al. 2013). However, we lack an understanding of how social 
media and different types of social media users might influence risk perceptions 
during these situations, and the influence of such processes on ensuing societal 
responses. Also, it is important to understand the level of reliance that public 
health authorities should place on social media conversations and the usefulness 
of this information for communication interventions. Finally, we need to consider 
how public health agencies can best utilize social media in order to influence risk 
information and perceptions that flow from the online to the offline world (e.g. 
steps that can or should be taken so that level of public concern is aligned with 
the actual threat posed by an IDO). Understanding these issues is necessary for 
designing and implementing effective risk communication in a landscape flush 
with social media.
This paper address gaps in our understanding of the role of social media in 
IDO risk communication by proposing a new conceptual model called the risk 
amplification through media spread (RAMS). We begin by reviewing two frame-
works of relevance to IDOs: the social amplification of risk framework (SARF) and 
the socially mediated crisis communication (SMCC) model. A case example that 
describes the social media strategies and tools used by the CDC during the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic is then presented. Drawing upon key concepts from the SARF and 
SMCC, and evidence from the case example, we propose and elucidate the RAMS 
model. The paper culminates with a discussion of the model’s theoretical and 
applied implications.
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2  Review of Conceptual Frameworks
2.1  The Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF)
The first, the SARF (Kasperson et  al. 1988; Renn 1991; Renn 1992; Kasperson 
and Kasperson 1996; Pidgeon et al. 2003) explicated the processes that underlie 
how a risk event generates an assessment of the risk, which is then amplified or 
attenuated through its engagement with psychological, social, institutional and 
cultural processes. The authors proposed a five-stage model that unravels after a 
risk event has occurred: sources of amplification (utilize) channels of amplifica-
tion (which transmit signals that are decoded by) social or individual stations of 
amplification, resulting in behavioral responses to the risk that can further lead 
to ripple effects at various levels of the social ecosystem.
Amplification, a term adapted from rhetoric theory, “… occurs when the situ-
ation of use … is exploited intentionally in order to enrich the interpretation of 
utterances” (Nerlich and Halliday 2007), with its converse being attenuation. An 
example of risk amplification or attenuation in an IDO scenario is when its threat 
perception is severe, leading to anxiety and worry, or not serious enough, leading 
to apathy. Social and individual amplification stations include scientists who 
conduct and communicate technical assessments of risk, risk management insti-
tutions, news media, opinion leaders, public agencies, and personal networks of 
peer and reference groups (Kasperson et al. 1988). These stations use metaphors, 
statistics and other devices to shape expectations and justify actions pertaining 
to risk events (Nerlich and Halliday 2007).
The SARF has been used, with varying levels of effectiveness, to study the 
heightening or softening of risk perceptions related to a range of environmen-
tal and health crises (Bakir 2005; Lewis and Tyshenko 2009). However, one of 
the recurring critiques of SARF has centered on the argument that by using 
the “amplification” metaphor, there is an implicit assumption that there exists 
a benchmark level of risk against which this phenomenon can be measured 
– and that might not be the case. While this argument gains traction in the 
fuzzy, and at times, ephemeral environs of the social contagion of risk, social 
media technologies provide the ability to objectively document not only com-
munication events (like individual Twitter feeds), but also provide the ability 
to use scientific methods to analyze these events (e.g. sentiment analysis) 
and/or to track their diffusion through digital networks. The use of social 
media-based infoveillance (portmanteau of information and surveillance) 
techniques (Chew and Eysenbach 2010) can help generate additional measures 
of risk perceptions and situate them against clinical levels of an outbreak’s 
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risk to the population, rendering the basic purpose of the SARF stronger in the 
years to come.
Another recurring critique of SARF has focused on its static or linear con-
ception of communication (Petts et al. 2001; Bakir 2005). Our perspective to this 
argument emerges from a mass communication lens, and suggests that the lin-
earity of the SARF and its model of effects were in some ways, suggestive of the 
top-down risk communication practices prevalent at the time when the model 
was conceptualized. Today, however, social media have created a new playing 
field for various groups of individual and institutional actors, each of whom has 
the ability to try to exert influence on information and communication related to 
an outbreak as it plays out across space and time.
We contend that some of these critiques have partly arisen because of the 
generic nature of the SARF, and the limitations can be addressed if the frame-
work is adapted to specific problem contexts, such as social media communica-
tion during IDOs.
2.2   Social-Mediated Crisis Communication (SMCC) Model 
and Health Crises
In an increasingly complex media environment, the SMCC model was proposed 
and empirically tested as a framework that could help crisis communicators decide 
if, when, and how to respond to influential social media, while also acknowledg-
ing the influence of traditional media and offline word-of-mouth communication 
(Liu et al. 2012). The SMCC model describes the relationships between an organi-
zation, key publics, social media, traditional media, and offline word-of-mouth 
communication before, during, and after crises.
The SMCC model identifies three key publics who seek, produce, or share 
information before, during, and after crises: influential social media creators, 
social media followers, and social media inactives (Jin et  al. 2014). Influential 
social media creators develop and post crisis information online; social media 
followers consume this information from social media creators and also share 
this information both on and offline; and social media inactives do not participate 
actively in the social media, but receive this crisis information via other channels 
– including traditional media and word-of mouth communication – from social 
media followers, creators, or other inactives.
The SMCC model also represented direct and indirect relationships in the flow 
of information. For example, social media inactives have an indirect relationship 
with social media, receiving information indirectly from followers and creators. 
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It also emphasized a two-way, reciprocal flow of information. For example, social 
media and traditional media directly inform one another’s crisis coverage with 
traditional media utilizing information from social media in news development 
and vice versa.
The model highlights three main forms of crisis communication – social 
media, traditional media, and offline word-of-mouth communication. The 
organization responding to an issue/crisis and the key publics are situated in the 
ubiquitous nature of offline word-of-mouth communication among the organi-
zation and social media creators, followers, and inactives. Social media, which 
may include information from influential social media creators or the organiza-
tion, have a direct relationship with key publics, the organization, and traditional 
media, while traditional media have a direct relationship with social media, key 
publics, and the organization.
SMCC can be applied not only to organizational crisis communication but 
also risk and health communication, as a theoretical framework explaining how 
media form and message source, along with other characteristics of key parties 
involved, make a difference in crisis, risk, and health information dissemination 
and reception. Specifically, SMCC can be used as a theoretical guide to further 
explore the following questions: (1) How do publics’ motivations to use social 
media in a health crisis vary depending upon the social media type and platform 
functionality?, (2) How and why are some social media functions more important 
to users than other functions during health crises? and (3) How do different types 
of health crises and publics’ demographics affect use and motivations for use of 
social media?
Beyond identifying why publics use (and do not use) social media in health 
crisis information seeking and sharing, more research is needed to examine what 
motivates specific individuals to become influential in creating and distribut-
ing crisis information (Fraustino et  al. 2014). Additional empirical research is 
needed to develop an understanding of how an individual or groups of individu-
als become influential and to map the information flow among these influential 
social media creators and social media followers and inactives, as outlined by 
the SMCC model. Such mapping also would allow researchers to evaluate which 
social media message features are most effective in convincing publics to take 
protective actions prior to, during, and after a health crisis such as an IDO.
A summary of similarities and differences between the two frameworks, and 
a snapshot of their relevance to socially mediated risk communication during 
IDOs is presented in Table 1. Having reviewed the two conceptual frameworks 
of interest, we now describe a real-world example of a major public health insti-
tution’s use of social media during a pandemic situation, based on one of the 
co-authors’ first-hand experience and observation.
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3   Case Analysis: CDC’s Use of Social Media 
in the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic
3.1  Overview of the Case
In mid-April 2009, a new strain of influenza (ultimately termed 2009 H1N1) was 
identified in a 10-year-old California patient. On April 21, 2009, CDC announced 
that it had identified the new strain in two patients, including the 10-year-old 
(CDC 2009). In the hours after this initial press conference, it was learned that 
health officials in Canada had just determined the strain was responsible for 
much of the influenza illness that had been occurring in Mexico. On April 26, 
the US government declared 2009 H1N1 a public health emergency. By June, 
18,000 cases of H1N1 had been reported in the US and a total of 74 countries were 
affected by the pandemic. The WHO declared a pandemic on June 9, 2009. By 
November 2009, 48 states had reported cases of 2009 H1N1 and limited supplies 
of vaccine were made available. Ultimately, CDC estimated that 43 million to 89 
million people had 2009 H1N1 between April 2009 and April 2010, with between 
8870 and 18,300 H1N1-related deaths. Around 80 million people in the US were 
vaccinated against H1N1 (CDC 2010).
CDC’s public communication response began in earnest on April 23 when CDC 
commenced the first of what would eventually be more than 60 press conferences 
related to 2009 H1N1. The major goals of CDC’s pandemic communications were to 
1) provide information and guidance that would help prevent or limit the spread of 
the disease; 2) to maintain trust and confidence in CDC and public health through 
constant information provision; 3) quickly identify and address questions and 
concerns; and 4) foster awareness and adoption of recommendations, including 
vaccination as vaccine became available. The initially daily press briefings, along 
with dozens of media interviews each week with top CDC officials and scientists, 
provided high visibility and reach for CDC’s information and guidance as well 
as served as the foundation for a multi-faceted health and risk communications 
response. Over the course of the pandemic, CDC’s health and risk communica-
tion response entailed frequent media briefings and interviews, extensive use of 
the Health Alert Network to reach clinicians and health care providers, collabora-
tion and coordination with a wide range of partners (e.g. state and local health 
departments, including public affairs, health care provider organizations), public 
service announcements, posters and flyers, a dedicated 2009 H1N1 website, fre-
quent updates and online trainings for health care providers, a hotline, and use of 
social media tools and channels (Kim and Liu 2012; National Collaborating Centre 
for Methods and Tools 2011; Walton and Seitz 2012; Pistol and Streinu-Cercel 2013).
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While news and traditional media were the primary means that CDC used to 
provide updates, guidance, key messages and resources to an array of partners 
and audiences, social media were a part of the response from the beginning. It 
was quickly determined that social media could help CDC in its efforts to provide 
timely health and risk information to as many people as possible. Social media 
enabled CDC to rapidly provide information and updates, reach people not typi-
cally reached via traditional media channels and outlets (e.g. younger people), 
tailor messages and materials, give people access to information on demand (e.g. 
via YouTube), get feedback from members of the public, and foster consistency 
in messaging and guidance among the many people and organizations that were 
providing 2009 H1N1-related advice and information, especially influential and 
interested social media users (Smith 2009).
3.2  Social Media Strategies and Tactics
As with the messages and materials disseminated via traditional media, social 
media communications and efforts were guided by risk communication princi-
ples, including 1) be as a candid as possible and foster transparency of infor-
mation and efforts; 2) foreshadow possibilities (e.g. with respect to how the 
pandemic or public health recommendations could play out); 3) share dilemmas 
(e.g. how to use the initially limited supplies of vaccine); 4) express empathy for 
those affected; 5) put risks into appropriate perspective and 6) accept and involve 
the public as a partner in coping with the pandemic.
The specific social media that CDC used to disseminate these messages 
during the pandemic included:
 – RSS or really simple syndication – this enabled interested people in the US and 
around the world to subscribe to the main CDC website or any of its components, 
such as the Division of Media Relations page. Tens of thousands of people used 
RSS to get updated pandemic flu information from CDC and it was estimated 
that RSS feeds fostered over 37 million views of CDC H1N1 information.
 – Content syndication – this enabled health departments, hospitals and any 
entity with a website to subscribe (for free) to CDC webpages with 2009 H1N1 
information and to display that information on their website. The benefit 
of content syndication was that when CDC updated a page, the informa-
tion was automatically updated on subscribers’ pages without the need for 
human involvement. Content syndication provided a streamlined process for 
disseminating risk and health information on thousands of websites. It was 
estimated that content syndication resulted in over 400,000 views of CDC 
information by December 2009 (Smith 2009).
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 – On-line video sharing, primarily via YouTube – In the course of the pandemic, 
CDC produced and posted 32 videos covering 2009 H1N1-related topics, which 
were viewed more than 3.13 million times. The most popular video, “Symp-
toms of H1N1” was viewed more than 2 million times and ranked in the top 
two videos across YouTube in the news and science category (National Col-
laborating Centre for Methods and Tools 2011).
 – Social Networking sites – CDC began using Twitter in October 2008 for posting 
information and updates related to seasonal influenza, but initiated its Face-
book page at the beginning of H1N1 flu outbreak (Biswas 2013). The Face-
book page was used to share H1N1 and seasonal flu updates, provide social 
media tools such as badges and widgets for users to download and share, and 
post blogs from CDC experts. By December 2009, the CDC Facebook page had 
around 53,000 fans. CDC used three Twitter pages, with two focused on H1N1 
situation updates and information on diagnosis, treatments and prevention. 
By December 2009, CDC had 1.18 million Tweeter followers and over 400,000 
clickthroughs of flu-related tweets.
 – Buttons, badges and widgets – the applications were used to enable partners 
and interested parties/people to post information on their websites of the 
steps that could be taken to prevent the spread of 2009 H1N1 and seasonal 
flu. Eleven flu-related widgets provided interactive resources, including sea-
sonal flu updates, school guidance and an interactive quiz. CDC flu widgets 
were viewed more than 5.5 million times by December 2009 (Smith 2009).
 – Podcasts – both audio and video podcasts were produced and available from 
the CDC website and through the iTunes store. By December 2009, the 2009 
H1N1 podcasts were viewed a total of 2.67 million times.
 – eCards – electronic greeting cards were created and developed so that indi-
viduals could send flu-related health messages to family members, friends 
and co-workers. By December 2009, over 22,000 eCards had been sent result-
ing in an estimated 103,000 views.
3.3  Impact and Lessons Learned
The above statistics on the online viewing, usage and sharing of CDC’s social 
media tools allude to the impact of CDC’s social media efforts on the level of 
engagement with the general public. While no studies have been conducted 
yet on the impact of CDC’s social media efforts on psychosocial and behavioral 
outcomes pertaining to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, most of the H1N1-related mes-
sages that CDC disseminated through social media fell into one of five categories: 
1) investigation/diagnosis; 2) preventive and safety measures; 3) treatment; 
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4) situation updates; and 5) promotion of web-based communication services 
and tools (e.g. video podcasts, widgets, virtual news briefing, press conference 
transcripts) (Biswas 2013).
Alongside its own initiatives, CDC was monitoring social media content on 
H1N1 and found that 16.2% of YouTube videos on 2009 H1N1 were misleading 
with the following themes: anti-vaccination messages, conspiracy theories about 
“manmade” H1N1 virus, government propaganda, and exaggerated H1N1 risks 
(Gesser-Edelsburg et al. 2014). Most critically, the social media strategy was suc-
cessful in strengthening public perception of CDC’s trustworthiness. Research 
showed that CDC’s quarterly score in the American Customer Satisfaction Index 
jumped from 74 to 82, and “people who used social media … rated CDC as more 
trustworthy than those who did not use CDC’s social media tools” (Reynolds 
2009).
In terms of lessons learned, it was traditional media that played a far more 
significant role, especially for CDC. CDC led with traditional media because their 
scope, reach and influence were far greater than Facebook or Twitter at the time. 
Large news media organizations and entities have online and social media plat-
forms that are far more effective and powerful than those of individuals who 
blog, tweet or post on Facebook pages, especially when it comes to IDOs. Most of 
CDC’s key risk communication messages are designed and disseminated via tra-
ditional media and partners and then re-purposed for use in social media. Also, 
the real-time, interactive nature of social networking media make it challenging 
for government agencies to provide responses in-real time to individuals, as most 
government messages require review and clearance. Finally, social media that 
reach and involve experts, such as blogs and the FluWiki Forum can be extremely 
useful for learning what other experts and interested parties are discussing.
4   New Conceptual Model: Risk Amplification 
through Media Spread (RAMS)
Drawing key ideas from the SARF and SMCC model, and evidence from the above 
case analysis, we propose the RAMS model presented in Figure 1. This model 
disambiguates the communication processes, the pathway of media influences, 
and the role of social media in influencing risk perceptions among the general 
public in the event of an infectious disease outbreak. The model’s nomenclature 
is intended to portray the diffusive movement of risk messages and perceptions 
through media channels. The word “amplification” has been chosen to be consist-
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ent with the vast amount of literature on SARF, although the model is designed 
to include its variants: attenuation/de-amplification and maintenance. Next, we 
use the generic word “media” instead of the specific “social media” (the focus of 
this paper) in recognition of the integrated nature of media channels in today’s 
communication environment. Finally, the term “media spread” does not refer to 
structural penetration of media channels but rather, the spread of risk percep-
tions through media in a manner, amplified or otherwise. Before elucidating the 
model, we present an operational definition of its key components:
4.1  Definitions
Risk event: We define a risk event as any instance of an infectious disease case or 
outbreak (IDO) that the public health community has confirmed through labora-
tory testing, and one that has the potential to spread through a social system, 
thereby posing a real or perceived threat to the health of the general public.
Public health community (PHC): The public health community includes all 
actors who are involved in governmental and non-governmental public health 
Psychological, social, cultural, institutional processes
Response to citizen information
Face-to-face
Traditional
media
Online media
Information from citizens
Psychological and behavioral outcomes
Social media
General
public
IDO
information
Public
health
community
Risk
event
Social stations
Individual stations
Diffusion through online
social networks
Influence of virality
Health stakeholders
Media influence
Policymakers Organizations Communities Individuals
Figure 1: The Risk Amplification through Media Spread (RAMS) Model.
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institutions and organizations (primarily health departments but also including 
community-based organizations), and the scientific community consisting of 
researchers who directly or indirectly examine or comment on issues related to 
public health.
Infectious disease outbreak (IDO) information: IDO information includes 
factual or opinion messages related to any scientific, social, physical or mental 
aspect of infectious diseases.
Traditional media: We define print and broadcast media as the physical forms 
of print and broadcast media, not connected to the Internet, such as newspapers, 
magazines, television and radio.
Online media: Online media refers to Internet-based media channels such as 
websites that are “static” (i.e. not allowing for nor providing tailored informa-
tion), and not interactive in the sense that users can input information and get 
customized guidance or advice.
Social media: Social media refers to web and mobile-based technologies and 
platforms that enable content creation, collaboration and exchange by partici-
pants and members of the public (Cohen 2011). We include traditional media that 
have websites and utilize social media to promote stories, disseminate stories or 
solicit input for stories.
The RAMS model considers a typical IDO scenario where one or more public 
health agencies, in collaboration with clinical experts, confirm a case or cases 
of a potentially harmful transmissible disease. From a public communications 
standpoint, the public health authorities devise a risk communication strategy 
commensurate with the type and level of current and potential threat the infec-
tious disease poses to 1) people who may have been exposed (e.g. by being in 
close recent contact with an infected individual or individuals); 2) the local popu-
lation or community; and 3) the broader public (e.g. recent air travel by infected 
or infectious people can have implications for cities beyond those that have con-
firmed cases). We postulate that the PHC usually disseminates their messages by 
engaging any or all of four main communication channels: face-to-face (F2F, such 
as community awareness workshops or town hall sessions), print and broadcast 
media, online media (organizational websites providing in-depth non-interactive 
information) and social media (including social networking sites and others). The 
variety and types of messages are not explicitly stated in the model as they would 
likely include a range or combination of themes from basic information about the 
modes of transmission, the global and local burden of the disease, preventive 
actions to be undertaken by the potentially exposed individuals and the public, 
to updates about the outbreak situation. Apart from factual information, messag-
ing could also potentially include opinion-based communication such as com-
mentaries by experts in the academic community.
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4.2  Process of Media Spread and Flow of Influence
From this stage, the model seeks to explain the process of media influence on risk 
perceptions among the general public. First, we postulate that face-to-face mes-
saging (e.g. a community meeting in the aftermath of a confirmed case of viral 
meningitis) or the initial stories in print and broadcast media outlets (e.g. about 
a person infected with a novel influenza virus) would influence risk perceptions 
among the general public either directly (e.g. those individuals who attended 
the community sessions or viewed/read/heard initial news reports) or indirectly 
(through a process of social contagion).
Second, we suggest that traditional media often further diffuse messages 
(comprising official information from the PHC as well as their own news reports) 
through offline, online and/or social media channels. For example, a print news 
organization can diffuse information and messages through the printed newspa-
pers, their website(s), social media widgets on their website, or share links to the 
news articles on social networking sites (as many journalists do). Communica-
tions through each of these avenues influences knowledge and risk perceptions 
among members of the public either directly (through direct exposure to the mes-
sages) or indirectly through social contagion.
Third, we postulate that IDO information is disseminated through static web-
sites ranging from websites of public health authorities directly involved to other 
public health authorities (e.g. state and local health departments not yet directly 
affected) to university and academic journals. This information typically includes 
statements and press releases about the infectious disease and its transmission. 
These communications can influence risk perceptions among members of the 
public either directly (for instance, individuals who actively seek this information 
on the WHO’s websites) or indirectly (through social contagion).
Fourth, and most importantly from the perspective of this paper the PHC 
community disseminates IDO risk information directly through social media 
channels. In terms of public communication, the distinguishing aspect of social 
media as opposed to other forms of media is that it enables instantaneous sharing 
of messages through online social networks, referred to in common parlance as a 
“message going viral.” This phenomenon merits further explanation.
4.3  Understanding Virality
Virality, now commonly used in the context of online content, was derived from 
infectious disease terminology that refers to the spread of a biological virus (Goel 
et al. 2013). From an online information transmission standpoint, the traditional 
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approach was to focus on virality in terms of access, electronic word of-mouth 
(eWOM), or engagement. Taking a user-centered behavioral approach to define 
virality, Alhabash and colleagues (2013) defined virality by identifying features 
of user interactivity with a persuasive message associated with “affective evalua-
tion (likes), viral reach (comments), and message deliberation (shares and views)” 
(Alhabash and McAlister 2014). Encompassing the above perspectives, virality, in 
our context, refers specifically to the potential for a message to spread across online 
social networks through a process of online social contagion (person-to-person 
sharing) by contact between individuals who have the message and those who 
do not. Goel and colleagues further deconstruct the metaphorical components of 
“virality” by explaining that an infectious agent (an idea or a message) is spread 
from the “infectives” (those who have it) to “susceptibles” (those do not) (pp. 1–2), 
much akin to the case of an IDO. The double helix in the model represents the 
non-linear (and at times, exponential) diffusion of risk information through online 
social networks while the node with the spokes indicates the virality of messages.
Different messages achieve different rates of virality based on a range of 
message characteristics, such as valence and the ability of the content to evoke 
positive or negative arousal (Berger and Milkman 2012). The SMCC model adds 
another dimension by identifying three key segments of publics – influential 
social media (content) creators, social media followers, and social media inac-
tives – based on the extent of influence and engagement they exert in the social 
media sphere. We incorporate this aspect to suggest that social media user types 
influence rates of virality of IDO information (and thus risk-related communica-
tions). For instance, we can hypothesize that key social media influencers might 
catalyze the highest rate of message virality, followed by social media followers 
and social media inactives, in that order. Along with directly influencing risk per-
ceptions among members of the general public, message virality can indirectly 
affect social conversations and in the process, shape risk beliefs and perceptions. 
In addition, given the features of social media and the recent definition of infor-
mation virality via social media, social media (content) sharers might be a fourth 
key public group, who might not necessarily create content but actively share 
content via social media to social media followers and via traditional media to 
social media inactives, thus gaining influence.
4.4  Communication Priorities during the Stages of an IDO
Based on literature and insights from IDO communication experience, the RAMS 
model provides a set of recommendations for communication priorities during 
the stages of an IDO (see Table 2). The key components of this table of recommen-
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dations are based on the main pillars of SARF and SMCC model, which also serve 
the founding blocks of the RAMS model.
On the one hand, RAMS recommends tailored communication activities 
according to different stages of an IDO, from preparedness, initial case(s), increas-
ing number of cases, “outbreak” (many cases in many places), to “recovery” (sig-
nificant decrease in number of cases). On the other hand, RAMS recognizes that 
depending on different IDO stages, different communication channels (e.g. online 
vs. offline), media forms (e.g. print and broadcast media), and key social media 
publics (e.g. social media creators and followers) play different roles in IDO infor-
mation spread. Public health information officers and communication practition-
ers need to understand the nature of each communication channel and media 
form, be prepared with tools that can timely be implemented at each stage, and 
synergize the strength of each interface of media spread in order for the accurate 
IDO information to be clearly and timely communicated to affected individuals 
and communities.
4.5  Theoretical Implications
The RAMS model accounts for future developments in the infectious disease 
emergency management domain by depicting two potentially influential path-
ways. First, we account for emerging investigations into the co-creation of health 
educational content (individuals contributing to message design) by depicting a 
direct pathway from the general public to the IDO Information box. This echoes 
the paradigm shift in strategic communication called for by Botan and Taylor 
(2004), moving from functional approaches to more co-creational approaches, 
with genuine interest and concrete emphasis on how publics create and share 
meaningful messages on issues. This audience-oriented co-creational approach 
to health and risk communication recognizes and emphasizes how social media 
has changed the way organizations and publics communicate to each other and 
among themselves, and more importantly, how organizations and publics co-
create meaning through the social-mediated health and risk information they 
share and manifest online and offline. Second, we depict the emerging domain of 
technology-driven participatory epidemiology (described in the literature review) 
through the dashed pathway showing disease-related information flowing from 
the public to the PHC, and a feedback loop of response from the PHC to the public.
From the classical SARF, the RAMS model incorporates three aspects. First, 
we depict how psychological, social, cultural and institutional processes influ-
ence the entire diffusion process of IDO information through multiple channels 
to the intended audiences. Second, the RAMS model identifies a dynamic flow of 
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information between two types of amplification stations: the social amplification 
stations consisting of the PHC and print and broadcast media, and individual 
amplification stations that comprise of members of the general public. The model 
identifies social media as both a social and individual station of amplification, as 
social media have the potential to host collectives of users (groups, communities) 
as well as individual users. Lastly, we adapt the SARF’s model of ripple effects 
and impacts to focus on two specific and related outcomes of the risk amplifi-
cation process: psychological and behavioral. Also, we adapt SARF’s multi-level 
model of effects to public health by suggesting that these outcomes affect four 
specific levels of the public health ecology: individuals, communities, institu-
tions and policymakers.
From the SMCC model, we adapted the concept of transitions of modern 
communication processes between face-to-face interactions, print and broad-
cast, online and social media. Although our primary focus remains on the role 
of social media during an IDO, our model, similar to SMCC, describes the role 
of social media in the fully integrated context of online and offline communi-
cations as well as the interconnected networks comprised of different forms of 
media and different sources of content creation and sharing. Therefore, the RAMS 
model recognizes the presence of a complex, highly integrated, media scenario 
offering multiple affordances to the user at once. Inheriting the publics-oriented 
approach from SMCC, the RAMS model identifies primary information sources 
during the IDO information spread: public health community and the publics, 
among whom influential social media creators and followers are actively engaged 
in risk communication activities, supplying, receiving, and processing informa-
tion both ways.
5  Summary and Future of RAMS Research
Recent IDOs have revealed fundamental challenges to the management of com-
munication efforts in the 21st century’s hyper-connected age, where social media 
cannot be ignored. The RAMS model, proposed in this paper, is the first step in 
bringing clarity to our understanding of the transmission of risk perceptions in 
a complex, often integrated media world. We discuss this model in terms of its 
value to the two frameworks that have informed its conceptualization and its 
practical utility to public health emergency efforts during an IDO.
In putting forth this model, we extended the domains of the SARF and SMCC 
model, and in the process, opened new lines of theoretical inquiry. The original 
and revised versions of SARF were developed when the Internet was either a 
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publicly inaccessible tool, or was in its nascent stage (the web 1.0). The RAMS 
model depicts how the presence of social media can alter the prevailing path-
ways of risk signals (i.e. IDO messages) through its multimodal and “viral” capa-
bilities, and thereby influence the amplification, attenuation or maintenance of 
risk perceptions. We demonstrate how distinctions between social and individual 
stations of amplification might be blurring with the emergence of social media. 
Most importantly, we addressed one of the main limitations in the SARF model, 
that of the linear depiction of the risk amplification process. By accounting for 
integration between different media systems, future technological develop-
ments enabling the emergence of circuitous communication channels, and the 
viral structure of information diffusion, we demonstrate that the risk amplifica-
tion process in the current media landscape is dynamic and complex rather than 
linear.
The RAMS model also expands the SMCC and addresses some of its limita-
tions. For instance, SMCC in its current form presents how one organization com-
municates about crisis information with key publics in a social-mediated context. 
The RAMS model introduces the concept of “social station” of publics, such as 
the PHC, which is especially critical in examining an IDO communication situ-
ation where multiple organizations are involved in information dissemination 
and public health crisis management. Within each “station,” whether being in 
the public station or in the public health community station, the group segments 
might create alliances, form coalitions, or create competition or even escalate 
conflict among themselves, depending on the situation. Thus, the expansion of 
the actors or key players in the new framework advances the scope and depth of 
the current SMCC.
Further, the RAMS model focuses on the creation, process and impact of IDO 
information virality, taking both computer interfaces and mobile technologies 
into consideration. This augments the explication of the concept of “influence” 
on social-mediated health and risk communication and identifies a key focal 
point to study unique risk and risk perception amplifications of IDO informa-
tion that social media bring to the health media cluster. These aspects of RAMS 
provide additional perspectives on why and why not organizations and publics 
use social media in different IDO situations.
From an applied perspective, the RAMS model serves as a new roadmap for 
the PHC to synergize the affordances of different media forms and communica-
tion channels when designing, implementing, and evaluating communication 
efforts. For preparedness, practitioners can evaluate the comparative effective-
ness of risk messaging across channels in related to their impact on risk percep-
tion, attitudes and beliefs, and adherence to emergency directives. During an 
outbreak where misconceptions and social anxiety can proliferate, knowledge of 
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social and individual amplification stations can be used to identify and detect 
those social entities that are catalyzing these reactions. This can inform inter-
ventions designed to quell rumors and social anxiety. An understanding of key 
social media influencers can help to strategically channelize messages through 
them, and potentially even recruit these influencers in the process of participa-
tory message design.
As a new conceptual model, RAMS has its limitations and much room for 
further refinement through empirical testing. Pathways and testable proposi-
tions on how specific RAMS components might predict IDO communication 
outcomes need to be further tested from multiple disciplinary lenses, includ-
ing but not limited to, health policy, health communication, traditional media 
effects theories, risk governance and social networks. For instance, future 
research can empirically test this new model by 1) conducting interviews with 
public health communicators on how they use social media and traditional 
media to communicate public health risks; 2) media content analyses of both 
traditional and social media in full life cycles of IDO cases to capture how the 
virality of certain IDO information was developed and amplified via the syner-
gized media spread process; 3) surveys of publics, based on their level of influ-
ence and social media engagement, to gauge the risk perception among social 
media creators, follower and inactives as well as what motivate publics (or not) 
when it comes to risk information seeking and sharing, as well as following 
instructions recommended by public health communities; and 4) experimental 
designs using representative samples to examine the cause-effect of key IDO 
communication factors, including the effects of message strategy, media form 
combination, disease type, and individual differences on IDO communication 
outcomes.
In conclusion, social media have catalyzed a paradigmatic shift in health 
risk communication by bringing a new dimension to how risk signals trans-
mit through social systems. The RAMS model brings clarity to the new com-
plexities in media management of IDOs by delineating the process of message 
diffusion and risk amplification through communication channels that are inte-
grated largely due to social media. Although the model has been constructed 
in an IDO backdrop, it can be applied to a broader suite of issues that impact 
public health such as foodborne illnesses, natural disasters and bioterrorist 
attacks. Further development of the RAMS model will depend on harnessing its 
potential to generate amplification measures, using big data analytics to track 
amplification routes and processes in the online world, and contributing to its 
conceptual refinement through continued empirical testing in a range of public 
health contexts.
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